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The	ghost	in	the	machine:	governing	‘data’	in
intellectual	monopolies
“The	observer	is	a	participant,	as	the	great	revolution	in	quantum	physics	has	taught	us.”
―	Will	Eaves,	Murmur.
Will	Eaves	short	story	‘Murmur’	is	a	fictive	account	of	the	life	of	the	British	scientist	Alan	Turing.	Personifying	the
individual	struggles	of	Turing	against	the	bureaucratic	violence	of	his	time,	the	story	also	does	a	remarkable	job	of
intertwining	the	scientist’s	research	with	his	intuition	about	the	future.	At	one	point,	Turing	wonders	at	the	possibility
of	one	of	his	inventions	being	placed	at	a	carnival	in	the	far	future.	This	invention	would	be	extraordinary,	for
encompassing	the	ambiguity	of	a	future	in	which	it	is	difficult	to	delineate	between	machines	and	humans.
	‘Are	you	a	man	or	a	machine?	And	the	answer	will	be	both.’	Eaves	(2018).
As	these	lines	suggest,	the	scientist	conceived	by	Will	Eaves	does	not	see	the	Turing	Test	(commonly	described	as
the	question	of	a	machine’s	ability	to	exhibit	intelligent	thought,	indistinguishable	from	a	human	Turing	1950)	as	a
dilemma	but	as	a	matter-of-fact	irreconcilability	of	the	future.	The	ends	of	human	thought	and	the	beginnings	of
decision-making	by	machines	would	be	indivisible.
Today,	this	future	run	by	‘thinking	machines’	is	still	in	the	making.	However,	the	problem	faced	by	modern	society	is
not	yet	that	of	machines	surpassing	human	intelligence,	but	more	archaically	grounded	in	how	to	dissuade	humans
from	acquiring	too	much.	Regulation	of	the	old-age	issue	of	monopolies	still	precedes	and	now	intertwines	with	the
issue	of	AI	and	decision-making	algorithms.
The	monopolistic	rise	of	platform	companies	highlights	that	governance	of	data	is	intrinsically	linked	to	how	the
operation	of	such	platforms	can	touch	upon	every	aspect	of	everyday	life.	The	term	‘platform’	highlights	the
intermediary	role	of	these	companies	in	connecting	different	users,	such	as	consumers	and	sellers,	advertisers	and
software	producers,	as	well	as	equipping	these	users	with	tools	to	build	their	own	marketplaces	(Evans	and
Schmalensee	2008).	Platformisation	can	be	understood	as	the	ability	of	these	companies	to	provide	a	host	of
interconnected	services,	which	enable	users	to	be	‘locked	in’	or	depend	on	these	companies	for	the	majority	of	their
consumption.	In	comparison	to	traditional	firms,	platform	companies	exhibit	high	monopolistic	tendencies	owing	to
‘network	effects’,	which	in	turn	capacitates	them	to	construct	an	ecosystem	of	ancillary	services	surrounding	their
initial	business	model	(Srnicek	2017;	Gawer	2014).
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A	key	issue	with	data	governance,	which	is	especially	visible	in	relation	to	the	rise	of	platform	companies	is	that
whilst	all	kinds	of	data	can	be	commodified,	the	varying	methodologies	of	commodification	have	not	yet	been
accompanied	with	complementary	regulation.	The	lack	of	data	regulation	is	enabling	multiplicities	of	value
extraction,	which	is	exercised	in	different	ways	and	ultimately	benefits	only	a	few	platform	companies	globally.	To
better	understand	the	lag	between	governance	and	monopolisation	of	data	by	companies,	the	following	discussion
introduces	the	term	‘intellectual	monopoly’	as	used	by	emerging	literature	and	focuses	on	the	limitations	of	current
data	privacy	regulation	in	controlling	intellectual	monopoly	extraction.
The	intellectual	monopoly	defined
The	term	‘intellectual	monopoly’	summarises	the	inordinate	ability	of	platform	companies	to	ride	and	dominate	the
current	data	revolution.	Intellectual	monopolies	have	become	the	“dominant	form	of	organisation	of	big	business”
(Pagano,	2014),	with	the	largest	firms	in	the	world	by	market	capitalisation	of	the	likes	of	Alibaba,	Alphabet,
Amazon,	Apple,	Facebook	etc.	all	dependent	on	IPR-related	rents	as	amongst	the	primary	sources	of	their
operating	revenues.
An	intellectual	monopoly	emerges	from	where	products	derived	from	intangibles	are	controlled	by	the	custodians	of
those	intangibles,	to	result	in	an	ongoing	ability	of	the	custodians	to	continue	to	benefit	from	such	control	and
ownership,	over	the	lifecycles	of	those	products	(Schwartz,	2016;	Birch	2019;	Durand	and	Milberg	2019;	Rikap
2020),	Such	monopolies	are	contingent	on	the	construction	of	knowledge	as	intellectual	property	by	the	assertion	of
private	ownership	rights	and	particularly	intellectual	property	rights	(IPRs)	over	such	knowledge	and	the	inspection
by	various	means	of	excludability,	into	the	ordinarily	non-rival	nature	of	such	knowledge	as	a	commodity.
Excludability,	in	this	context,	extends	to	both	consumers	and	competitors,	with	a	view	to	the	creation	of	real	market
power	and	the	ability	of	the	intellectual	monopoly	to	preclude	and	stifle	subsequent	innovation	by	others	derivative
of	the	monopolised	knowledge.	Simultaneously,	excludability	allows	the	intellectual	monopoly	to	entrench	its
dominant	position	in	the	markets	for	speculative	products,	resultant	of	the	monopolised	knowledge,	and	for	the
monopolised	knowledge	itself.
For	example,	in	Case	T-201/104,	Microsoft	Corp.	v.	Commission,	[2007]	5	C.M.L.R.	846,	Microsoft	sought	to	avoid
making	its	technology	available	to	competitors	by	claiming	that	doing	so	“would	…	eliminate	future	incentives	to
invest	in	the	creation	of	more	intellectual	property”	or	in	other	words	reduce	Microsoft’s	incentive	to	develop	that
technology.	This	argument	was	rejected	for	being	“vague,	general,	and	purely	theoretical”	as	the	prospective
technologies	or	products	were	not	identified	or	specified	by	Microsoft.
Intellectual	monopoly	and	privacy
Existent	data	privacy	protections	highlight	yet	another	facet	of	the	regulatory	gap	in	addressing	intellectual
monopolies.	This	is	particular,	as	data	of	any	kind	generally	cannot	itself	be	legally	owned	as	intellectual	property;
and	it	cannot	be	subject	to	copyright,	trademark	or	patent	laws	as	discussed	in	Oxford	v	Moss	(1979)	and	others.
Intellectual	monopolies	rely	on	the	availability	of	“para-copyright”	or	the	means	to	make	data	excludable	to	others,
as	their	sole	basis	to	monopolise	such	data.	This	becomes	inequitable	from	the	perspective	of	the	actual	authors	of
such	data,	as	their	data	can	and	does	result	in	the	generation	of	value	and	in	and	of	itself	also	therefore	has	value.
Data	can	thus	be	argued	to	also	have	“property-like”	characteristics,	even	if	it	cannot	legally	be	considered	to	be
property	in	its	own	right.
The	most	prominent	examples	of	regulatory	regimes	addressing	data	privacy	are	the	General	Data	Protection
Regulation	(Regulation	(EC)	2016/679)	(‘GDPR’)	and	the	California	Consumer	Privacy	Act	of	2018	(‘CCPA’).	These
regulations	generally	offer	protections	for	the	personal	data	of	natural	persons,	defined	as	“data-subjects”	and
“consumers”.
Such	personal	data	in	the	case	of	the	GDPR	consists	of	“personally	identifiable	information”	including	personal
names,	addresses	and	location	data,	online	identifiers	such	as	IP	addresses	or	cookie	identification	as	well	as
medical,	genetic	and	biometric	data,	sexual	or	lifestyle/orientation,	health	data,	and	criminal	records	etc.	The	rights
afforded	to	data-subjects,	vis-à-vis	their	personal	data	relate	to	the	use	of	such	being	aligned	with	the	expectations
of	the	data-subject/consumer,	for	them	to	be	informed	of	such	use,	to	be	able	to	access,	erase	or	rectify	their	data
and	so	on.	These	rights	do	not	include	any	kind	of	general	restrictions	on	the	sale	of	personal	data	under	the	GDPR
but	are	only	limited	to	the	“data	controller”	having	a	lawful	basis	for	the	processing.	The	CCPA	goes	further	giving
“consumers”	the	right	to	opt	out	the	sale	of	their	personal	data.
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For	the	purposes	of	intellectual	monopoly,	regulations	of	the	likes	of	GDPR	or	the	CCPA	do	not	extend	to	any	other
kind	of	data	directly	or	indirectly	generated	by	data-subjects,	beyond	their	personal	data.	Ownership	of	even
personal	data	by	the	data-subject	is	not	acknowledged.	Secure	control	and	technical	means	(para-copyright),
presumably	in	conformity	with	Directive	96/9/EC	(database	directive)	is	assumed,	particularly	under	the	GDPR.
The	“property-like”	characteristics	of	data,	by	way	the	ability	of	the	data-custodian	to	sell	collected	data	and
presumably	employ	such	data	to	innovate	and	accrue	rents	(subject	to	relevant	compliance	with	the	regulatory
framework)	are	fully	recognised.	However,	rent	and	value	capture	by	intellectual	monopolies,	by	employing
consumer	and	data-subject	generated	non-personal	data,	is	not	addressed	in	either	the	GDPR	or	the	CCPA.	In	this
regard,	regulatory	privacy	protections	do	not	impede	or	indeed	even	seek	to	regulate	the	behaviours	of	intellectual
monopolies	in	relation	to	different	kinds	of	rents	and	add	very	little	to	the	body	of	competition	law	(See	Khan	2016;
Coyle	2020).
Given	that	intellectual	monopolies	do	not	promulgate	wealth	and	resource	distribution	even	within	the	framework	of
the	conventional	capitalist	model,	and	incline	towards	dissonance	from	productivity-enhancing	investment	in
different	ways	(See	Azmeh	and	Foster	2016;	Sial	2020),	the	regulation	of	such	monopolies	to	accrue	ever
increasing	inordinate	rents	requires	a	robust	and	holistic	set	of	regulations.	The	quadrupling	of	wealth	by	these
companies	under	the	current	conditions	of	a	global	pandemic	substantiates	these	concerns	and	should	be	seen	as
a	primer	for	future	expansion,	unless	controlled	through	corresponding	regulations.
Such	regulation	should	move	away	data	monopolisation	and	even	ideas	of	corporate	“data-stewardship”	towards
strategies	that	empower	the	public	domain	(See	Shah	2018;	Savona	2020).
♣♣♣
Notes:
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